This commentary reflects the views of the author and does not represent the position of the BCIS. If cited, reproduced, or shared online, please link to the URL and credit the author. For any queries, please email researchdivision@bcis.edu.lk
Priyanthi Fernando*
Very often, the conversation around gender equality in foreign policy focuses on the equal representation of women in the foreign service, and in the military. I have heard the CEDAW Committee often question state parties about how many ambassadors or how many high ranking military and police officers are women, and I have always felt that this is not the right question. I am not saying women’s representation is not important, but we in South Asia especially know that having women as heads of state isn’t sufficient to challenge the patriarchy or do a lot for gender equality. In Sri Lanka, we have had many women in high offices – Presidents, Prime Ministers, Chief Justices, Attorney Generals – but I am not sure any of that has done much for gender equality in Sri Lanka, at least not until now. Let’s hope our new Prime Minister, a feminist and women’s rights activist will indeed make a difference!
We recently heard also US Vice President Kamala Harris in her nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, talk about her own immigrant mother’s experience and focus on justice, non-discrimination, human rights, anti-gun violence, pro-sexual reproductive health and rights – highlighting all the issues that as feminists and as women we see as important. She also proudly declared that she was ‘’Kamala Harris for the People”, but then she vowed that as Commander-in-Chief of the US Military, she would “ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world”.
This Commentary reflects the views of the author and does not represent the position of the BCIS. If cited, reproduced or shared online, please link to the URL and credit the author. For any queries, please email researchdivision@bcis.edu.lk.
Sinduja Umandi W. Jayaratne*
The Anti-Terrorism Bill of Sri Lanka was gazetted on September 15th, 2023, and presented to the Parliament by the Minister of Justice, Prison Affairs and Constitutional Reforms on 10th January 2024. The Bill has drawn the attention of the public due to its many pros and cons and has been criticized by different interest groups.
This commentary takes a Terrorism Studies perspective and highlights the importance of defining the term ‘terrorism’ by the State (Sri Lanka) as a specific offence so that it will be able to avoid any controversies in criminalizing other acts that do not fall within the generally accepted definition of ‘terrorism’. The authors’ position is that because the term ‘terrorism’ is not defined by the Bill, there is too much vagueness in the offences listed, and therefore prioritizing ‘acts of terrorism’ has not been maintained as the focus of the Bill. This vagueness also allows for criticism of the Bill as a possible restriction and/or violation of human rights.
This Commentary reflects the views of the author and does not represent the position of the BCIS. If cited, reproduced or shared online, please link to the URL and credit the author. For any queries, please email researchdivision@bcis.edu.lk.
Debt payments of developing countries exceed their national revenue. Even though external debt is crippling economies in the global South, neither the financial and economic reform policies (structural reforms) advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank nor the developing countries as a geo-political bloc have responded sufficiently to address the crisis at hand. While the structural reforms advocated by IMF and the World Bank have become counterproductive, isolated responses of the developing countries to their respective debt crises have impeded a collaborated and coordinated strategy to hold international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank responsible and address the escalation of debt distress in developing countries following the interest rate hikes in the US and EU, Ukraine-Russia war and the COVID-19 pandemic, i.e. the New Debt Crisis.
The absence of an informed collective response vis-à-vis the external debt problem is more palpable in South Asia compared to Latin America or Africa. This article is a preliminary attempt to bridge the gap by analysing South Asia’s debt crisis. While contextualising the new debt crisis affecting South Asian countries, I argue that cultural explanations of the debt crisis of developing countries, undermining the political economy dimension of corruption, have not just diverted our attention away from addressing the structural weaknesses of the South Asian economies, making us accept poison as medicine. They have also stopped us from holding the IMF and the World Bank responsible for failing to ensure the stability of the global financial order, particularly in the interests of developing countries.